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There are several ways of thinking about and trying to understand the
application of labor laws in Indian country. One approach is to analyze this
legal development from a doctrinal perspective by examining how the prin-
cipal decisions in the field' part ways with important Indian law precedents,
incorrectly apply the decision of Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation,2 and perpetuate a faulty paradigm under Donovan v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Farm.3
Another approach examines the issue from a pro-sovereignty perspec-
tive.4 This approach emphasizes the legislation and policy-making tools
available to tribes to protect tribal interests in the face of the San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB decision.' It also looks at what impacts the
San Manuel decision is likely to have on the exercise and preservation of
sovereignty.6
A third useful way of thinking about the application of labor law in
Indian country is one rooted in an economic analysis of law. This Article
takes up a law and economics approach to understanding why tribes en-
counter difficulty when they attempt to govern labor relations using tribal
laws and methods of dispute resolution. The law and economics approach
is particularly helpful because its emphasis on microeconomics sheds light
on the dynamics of the choices that employees and union organizers make
as they decide how to proceed to protect labor interests in Indian country.
The principal law and economics tool that this Article uses to analyze
the application of labor law in Indian country is the concept of path depend-
ence and its application to the development of legal institutions. Part I of
this Article will describe path dependence and identify its core properties,
including self-reinforcing patterns of development, lock-in, and the poten-
tial for inefficient outcomes. -Part II will then describe path dependence in
the context of institutional economics. This Part will explain how the con-
cept of path dependence can serve as a valuable tool for explaining the dy-
1. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055 (May 28, 2004); Donovan v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985)
2. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
3. 751 F.2d at 1113. See Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-
Governance, 80 N.D. L. REv. 691 (2004) (critically evaluating the decision in San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1055); Brian H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law,
Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REv. 413 (2007).
4. I also recognize that the doctrinal analysis is pro-sovereignty.
5. Kaighn R. Smith, Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and Judicial Restraint: The
Problem of Labor and Employment Relations Within the Reservation, 2008 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 505.
6. Id. at 540-42.
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namics of institutional development and legal development in general. Part
III will then apply the concept of path dependence to the specific case of
labor laws and their application in Indian country. This Part will describe
why employees and labor organizers are predisposed to rely on federal labor
law remedies to protect labor interests without relying on available tribal
law remedies. Part IV evaluates the relative efficiencies of continued reli-
ance on federal law to determine labor relations in Indian country. Part V
offers the first serious analysis of the relative efficiencies of turning to tribal
law as a replacement, and it examines ways tribes can enact and develop a
labor relations body of law.
I. APPLYING LAW AND ECONOMICS TO INDIAN LAW
Although there is great diversity of scholarship in the field of Indian
law, the law and economics approach to exploring Indian law is distinctly
marginalized.7 Instead, much of Indian law scholarship focuses on argu-
ments based on the core attributes of tribal sovereignty, other doctrinal ar-
guments, federalism, history, principles of statutory and treaty interpreta-
tion, and morality-based claims. These approaches are often shaped by the
perspectives of Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory,
and Legal Process.8 These are all valid and essential approaches to under-
7. Scholarship that takes up a law and economics approach to Indian law questions
includes Terry Anderson & Dominic Parker, The Wealth of Indian Nations: Economic Per-
formance and Institutions on Reservations, in SELF DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR
NATIVE AMERICANS 159 (Terry L. Anderson et. al. eds., 2006); Ezra Rosser, This Land is My
Land, This Land is Your Land: Markets and Institutions for Economic Development on Na-
tive American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245 (2005); Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency:
Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1065 (2000); Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights; or, "How the West Was
Really Won", 34 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1991); Fred S. McChesney, Government as Definer of
Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 297 (1990); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L.
& ECON. 177 (1990). Other examples include Paul H. Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The Law
and Economics of Native American Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REv. 263 (1999); Russel Lawrence
Barsh, Coast Salish Property Law: An Alternative Paradigm for Environmental Relation-
ships, 12 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2005); Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William
Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-
Rule 3 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No.
RWP04-016, 2004), available at http:/ ssm.com/abstract=-529084.
8. Legal Realism example: Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Trancendental Non-
sense: Toward a New Legal Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REv. 649 (2006).
Critical Legal Studies examples: RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD
HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980); Susan Staiger Good-
ing, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities in United States v. Oregon, Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff-Intervenor, 28 LAW & SoC'y REv. 1181 (1994).
Critical Race Theory examples: Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Prax-
is: Lessons from Two Young Lives in Indian County, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2133 (2005);
489
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standing legal developments in Indian law, and, in addition to their explana-
tory power, they shed light on strategies that may prove to be effective me-
thods of protecting Indian rights.
At the same time, however, the approaches described above also need
to be supplemented with analyses that reflect the fact that economic effi-
ciency is a central concern in much of legal analysis, especially in the arena
of commercial law.9 Economic efficiency influences the jurisprudence of a
substantial portion of the federal judiciary, and it informs lawmakers in
Congress, as well as the execution and enforcement of the law by govern-
ment administration. l To neglect to consider how considerations of eco-
nomic efficiency apply in the field of Indian law, then, is to risk failing to
address a core concern of each of the three branches of government. The
result of this failure can lead to a missed opportunity to engage in an open,
intellectual dialogue on these core concerns, and the result may be that false
assumptions go unchallenged, and, perhaps more dangerously, faulty con-
clusions go unchecked.
Of course, Law and Economics is not a homogenous body of scholar-
ship with universally-accepted modes of analysis. The field of law and eco-
nomics includes great diversity, as reflected in the approaches employed by
the Chicago School," Public Choice Theory, 2 Institutional and New Institu-
tional Law and Economics, 3 the New Haven School, Modern Civic Repub-
licanism, and Critical Legal Studies. 4 Although each approach represents a
unique focus and methodology, each also shares the following trait in com-
mon: they all use tools of economic analysis-particularly microeconomics
and welfare economics-to examine the dynamics and structure of law and
legal institutions. 5 In this Article, I apply the New Institutional Law and
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219. Legal
Process example: Philip P. Frickey, Context and Legitimacy in Federal Indian Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1973, 1978 (1996).
9. See generally Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contrac-
tual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
233 (2003).
10. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW Pt. 2 (7th ed. 2007).
11. See generally JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL: How THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ASSEMBLED THINKERS WHO REVOLUTIONIZED ECONOMICS AND
BUSINESS (2007).
12. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
13. See generally Douglass North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic
Growth, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 419 (1987); Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Econom-
ics, 142 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986).
14. NICOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN J. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 3 (2d ed. 1997).
15. Id.
490 [Vol. 2008:487
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Economics approach to study the dynamics of the development, application,
and enforcement of labor law in Indian country.
The school of New Institutional Law and Economics is particularly re-
levant to explore developments in labor law because unions, collective or-
ganizing, labor negotiations, and labor law are each fundamentally shaped
and influenced by the structure of institutions and the dynamics of institu-
tional change. In the Part that follows, I will describe the key concepts of
the New Institutional Law and Economics to lay the foundation for a dis-
cussion of how these concepts can enhance our understanding of labor law
in Indian country.
II. PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
The field of New Institutional Economics and the concept of path de-
pendence that it applies can help us to understand why tribes encounter
great difficulty when they attempt to regulate labor relations within their
jurisdictions. In this Part, I will begin by defining path dependence. I will
then identify some of the factors that can create path dependence, and I will
describe some of the effects of path dependent systems. In the next Part, I
will show how the theory of path dependence applies to federal labor laws
being used in Indian country.
First, what is path dependence? In very broad terms, path dependence
affirms the principle that "history matters."16 In other words, it means that
an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the
historical path leading to such an outcome or decision.17 Path dependence
means more than just "history matters," however. The theory of path de-
pendence also explains how early events or decisions can establish paths
that are "locked-in" or resistant to change.1
In general terms, path dependence theory holds that institutions are in-
herently self-reinforcing, and that through history, institutions establish
well-worn paths in which decisions initially taken are reinforced through
repetition. Path dependence theory is a form of economic analysis of the
law because it recognizes that legal institutions develop and perpetuate
short-sighted efficiencies through the creation and maintenance of these
paths. 19
16. Paul A. David, Path Dependence: A Foundational Concept for Historical Social
Science, 1 CLIOMETRICA, J. HIST. ECON. & ECONOMETRIC HIST. 91, 92 (2007).
17. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REv. 601, 603-04 (2001).
18. See id. at 605.
19. DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 95 (1990).
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Oona Hathaway identifies three strands of path dependence theory.
They include increasing returns path dependence, evolutionary path de-
pendence (evolution is directly constrained by history), and sequencing path
dependence (the order in which decisions are made and choices are made
can decisively determine an outcome).20 Of the three, this Article focuses
on increasing returns path dependence to shed light on labor relations in
Indian country.
Increasing returns path dependence, which grows out of the economics
literature, arises where there are economies of increasing returns. 2' In law,
once certain legal steps are made, it becomes less costly to continue taking
steps in the same direction; once institutions are established, it becomes less
costly to continue to work within those existing institutions than to change
or replace them.22
Brian Arthur explains that increasing returns can arise where certain
conditions are present23:
(a) Large set-up orfixed costs. Where institutional structures and op-
erations require large set up costs, there is a greater incentive to identify and
stick with a single option rather than experiment with new alternatives.
(b) Learning effects. When individuals use complex systems repeat-
edly, their knowledge and ability to operate effectively and efficiently in-
creases. These experiences are then likely to spur greater innovations and
improvements in the existing system and its related elements.
(c) Coordination effects. These occur when the benefits an individual
receives from taking a particular action increases as others take similar or
complementary actions. If an institutional regime is adopted and applied by
a network of individual actors, then further actions within the regime will
become more attractive to other individuals.
(d) Self-reinforcing or adaptive expectations. These are expectations
that lead actors to react to current conditions in ways that enhance the like-
lihood that similar conditions will persist in the future. For example, if a
large number of individuals anticipate that a particular institutional regime
will be widely used in the future, these individuals are likely to act in accor-
dance with the anticipated institutional regime. Consequently, there will be
an increase in the likelihood that it will be broadly used in the future.24
Where these conditions are present, "a step in one direction decreases
the cost (or increases the benefit) of an additional step in the same direction,
20. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 606-22.
21. NORTH, supra note 19, at 94-97.
22. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 608-13.
23. W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY 112 (1994).
24. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 608-13.
[Vol. 2008:487
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creating a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity or positive feedback."25
This can result in lock-in or inflexibility. Examples described in economics
include the rise of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, the pattern of geo-
graphic location of various industries, and institutional emergence and
change. In each example, the same general observation is made, that
"[w]here a process of change exhibits increasing returns dynamics, each
step in one direction makes additional steps in that same direction more
likely. This characteristic leads to predictable results.... "27
Douglass North, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993,28 has
applied increasing returns path dependence to explain institutional emer-
gence and change.29 According to North, institutional path dependence ex-
ists because "the individuals and organizations with bargaining power as a
result of the institutional framework have a crucial stake in perpetuating the
system."3 Paths can get reversed, but reversal is a difficult process about
which we know little.
North also writes about what he calls the certain essential characteris-
tics of institutional change: (a) that institutions and organizations interact
amidst scarcity and competition and that competition is the key to institu-
tional change; (b) that competition leads to a constant need to invest in
learning to acquire skills and knowledge, and that the resulting learning
shapes perceptions about opportunities and choices; (c) that the institutional
framework dictates the kind of skills and knowledge perceived to produce
the maximum pay-off; and (d) that economies of scope, complementarities,
and network externalities of an institutional matrix make institutional
change overwhelmingly incremental and path dependent. Overall, since the
organizations owe their existence to the institutional matrix, there will al-
ways be interest groups that will work to assure the perpetuation of that
institutional structure, thus assuring path dependence.31
North also identifies several remedies for institutional reform that de-
feat path dependence. They include the creation and support of organiza-
tions that have an interest in succeeding under new institutional regimes; the
25. Id. at 609.
26. See id. at 611.
27. Id. at 613.
28. See Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 1993, http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economics/laureates/1993/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
29. NORTH, supra note 19; Douglass C. North, The Historical Evolution of Politics
(1994), available at http://www.inomics.com/cgi/repec?handle=RePEc:wpa:wuwpeh:
9411007; Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL.
355 (1990).
30. Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Theory, 36 AM. ECONOMIST 3
(1992).
31. See id. at 6.
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education of individuals to encourage the adaptation of their knowledge,
skills, and belief systems to the new institutional regime; and the encour-
agement of informal constraints (the second key ingredient of institu-
tions)-such as norms of behavior, conventions, and codes of conduct-that
support the new institutional regime. 2
III. PATH DEPENDENCE AND LABOR LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In the case of labor within tribal economies, the institutions involved
are the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "Act"),33 the relevant fed-
eral law interpreting and applying the Act, and emerging tribal law. Institu-
tions are also understood to be in a constant state of interaction with organi-
zations-both political and economic. In the case of labor in Indian coun-
try, the organizations include unions, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board), tribal councils, and other bodies of employees and labor
policy-makers.34
When we see employees resorting to union organizing in Indian coun-
try under the NLRA and unions resorting to the NLRB to resolve tribal la-
bor disputes, what we are also seeing is the use of well-worn institutions
that have become adept over many years at using institutionalized remedies
for the protection of employee rights.35 It is simply assumed that reliance on
the NLRA and the NLRB as the primary enforcement agency for labor
rights is the most efficient means of protecting labor interests. This is partly
due to the fact that the mindset of employees has been shaped by their fa-
miliarity with the existing institutional structure of labor organizing under
federal law. Not only are employees' perceptions of their opportunities and
choices limited by their familiarity with the existing labor law regime out-
side of Indian country, but unions also have a vested interest in maintaining
the status quo of working within the established NLRA system, based on
years of developing the skills and knowledge that provide the ingredients
for success in the current regime of labor relations. Thus, the unions that
have sought to organize in Indian country are deeply invested in the protec-
tion of employee rights under the rubric of the NLRA, so continuing to re-
32. See id. at 7-8.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
34. For a recent update on how labor unions operate in Indian country, see D. Mi-
chael McBride, III & H. Leonard Court, Labor Regulation, Union Avoidance and Organized
Labor Relations Strategies on Tribal Lands: New Indian Gaming Strategies in the Wake of
San Manuel Band of Indians v. National Labor Relations Board, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1259 (2007).
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sort to federal remedies for the protection of employee interests becomes
both reflexive and preferred.
The literature on path dependence theory also points out, however,
that path dependence can produce significant inefficiencies.36 Even though
an alternative outcome might be more efficient, institutional reform or re-
placement of an institution with an alternative model is unlikely because of
the short-sided perception of the positive feedback loop of perceived in-
creasing returns for decreasing outputs for each unit of production." In
other words, the pressure to continue taking steps down the same path effec-
tively thwarts attempts to begin a new path that will involve significant new
start-up costs, a renewed high learning curve, and a need for new invest-
ment in gaining the skills and knowledge necessary for the accomplishment
of goals under the new regime.
The next Part will reexamine the utility of continued reliance on fed-
eral law from an institutional economics perspective.
IV. RETHINKING RELIANCE ON FEDERAL LAW
Indian tribes should examine the choices available to an individual
employee of a tribal gaming operation seeking to improve his or her work-
ing conditions, wages, or benefits. If we look at the costs and benefits that
attach to each of the choices available to that employee, we can also de-
velop a deeper understanding of why employees might choose the avenues
for protecting their rights that they ultimately adopt. An examination of
these costs and benefits might also help tribes to influence employee deci-
sions through the adjustment of these costs and benefits where such adjust-
ments are possible. More specifically, although there are inherent efficien-
cies in relying on the well-worn remedies of union organizing and NLRB
enforcement of federal labor laws, if tribes can offer less costly alternatives
for the protection of employee rights using tribal legal remedies, they may
be able to encourage more employees to choose to rely on tribal remedies
over NLRB enforcement.
A. Inefficiencies of Reliance on Federal Law
1. The Modern Decline of Labor Unions
Unions have experienced a substantial and continuous decline in the
United States since 1960. This decline can be measured by changes in un-
ion density over time. Union density refers to the percentage of wage and
36. See generally S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In,
and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
37. See Hathaway, supra note 17, at 608 n.20.
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salary employees in the workforce who are members of unions. Between
1970 and 2001, private sector union density fell from 29.1% to 9.0%." This
is a 69% decline in union density over thirty-one years.
2. The NLRB as an Archaic and Inefficient Enforcement Mechanism
The NLRB's enforcement of labor law has been subject to scathing
critiques on a variety of fronts. First, the Board has been criticized by scho-
lars as being isolated.39 James Brudney argues that the NLRB's autonomy
has isolated it, diminishing its relevance and applicability to the contempo-
rary employment context. 4° Brudney points to union decisions to rely on
direct negotiations with employers for neutrality agreements and voluntary
card check registration as evidence that unions increasingly view the NLRB
and its Board-supervised elections process as irrelevant. 4' Brudney also
cites several other factors that illustrate and contribute to the Board's grow-
ing isolation. These include Congress's inaction in the arena of collective
organizing law since the passage of the NLRA in 1935,42 the Act's restric-
tive right of access to the federal courts,43 the Board's use of adjudication
rather than rule-making as its nearly exclusive means of acting," and the
Board's pattern of frequently refusing to acquiesce to decisions of the fed-
eral courts.45
Apart from the Board's increasing isolation, Brudney also makes the
case that the Board has become increasingly politicized, and that this politi-
38. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future,
26 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J. 221, 253 (2004) (citing SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & NOAH M.
MELTZ, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 52 (2004)).
39. See id; Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the
Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 571
(2007).
40. See Brudney, supra note 38, at 253.
41. Id. at 251. See also, e.g., Remarks by AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney to
ABA Labor and Employment Law Section, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-44 (July 12, 2000);
Eric Lekus, Card Check, Neutrality Accords, Best Way for Unions to Organize, UNITE's
Raynor Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-i (June 4, 2004); Michelle Amber, Special Re-
port: SEIU Sees Record Growth: 64,000 New Members Organized in 1998, Lab. Rel. Week
(BNA), at 1419-21 (Dec. 23, 1999) (reporting that of 64,000 workers in newly SEIU-
organized bargaining units, less than 15,000 came through Board elections).
42. Cf. generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Rep-
resentation: The Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 903, 903-04 (2007).
43. Brudney, supra note 38, at 231-34.
44. See Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89
YALE L.J. 982, 982 (1980) (citing NILRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95
(1974)).
45. See Donald L. Dotson & Charles M. Williamson, NLRB v. The Courts: The
Needfor an Acquiescence Policy at the NLRB, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 739 (1987).
[Vol. 2008:487
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cization has weakened its ability to serve its purpose.4 6 The problem is that
the members of the NLRB have come to represent a polarized group of par-
tisans rather than a collection of neutral and impartial decision-makers.
Although this partisanship is inconsistent with Congress's purpose in estab-
lishing the make-up of the Board in the NLRA, the political nature of the
appointments process has resulted in a Board whose members are selected
for their allegiance to interest groups that explicitly espouse pro-
management or pro-labor policies. As a result of this politicization, both
management and labor have shown less respect for Board decisions.47
3. The NLRB Not Suited to Indian Country Labor Regulation
The NLRB is also new to tribal labor regulation. A variety of issues
unique to Indian tribes has never been resolved. An example is the issue of
whether the NLRB can enter a tribal business to hold elections to certify a
union. Jason Cotter, NLRB Regional Director involved in the Foxwoods
Resort Casino union election,48 stated:
How many cases has the board had where we deal with Indian casinos? It's not
your classic case involving your factory someplace. We don't have a whole lot of
history dealing with Indian casinos. We're relying entirely on the prior San Ma-
nuel case, but that's only one prior case. It's not like General Motors, where we
have 10,000 prior cases. It's purely speculative on my part, but I can't be sure
whether the board wants to re-evaluate or what.
49
As a result, the NLRB's new effort to exercise jurisdiction over tribal
gaming facilities is likely to raise a variety of new legal issues that will re-
quire litigation before they are fully resolved. This process of case-by-case
resolution of legal issues diminishes legal certainty and delays employees'
abilities to realize the full benefits of the Act.
46. Brudney, supra note 38, at 243-52.
47. See id. at 250 (citing Kenneth R. Dolin, Estreicher Urges Reforms to Address
NLRB "Policy Oscillation", A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 2 (Spring 2005)).
48. In November 2007, an election was held at Foxwoods Resort Casino in which
poker dealers voted 1282-852 to join the United Auto Workers Union. The Casino allowed
NLRB oversight of the election, but it reserved the right to challenge the Board's jurisdiction
in the appeals process.
49. Gale Courey Toensing, Federal Labor Board OKs Union Vote at Mashantucket,
INDiAN COUNTRY TODAY, Nov. 7, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfm?id= 1096416045 (quoting Jason Cotter, NLRB Regional Director).
HeinOnline -- 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 497 2008
Michigan State Law Review
B. Efficiencies of Reliance on Federal Law
1. Board Perceived as a Neutral Party
The NLRB is perceived as "neutral" compared to tribal agencies de-
veloped to oversee labor relations.
Employees of tribal employers have made many statements to the
press indicating that they do not trust tribal governmental created to hear
labor disputes." The NLRB has a distinct advantage over tribal agencies in
that it has no relationship to the tribe and is therefore more likely to be per-
ceived as a neutral party that is not beholden to the tribe's business interests.
2. Familiarity
Since the NLRA and NLRB are familiar institutions, employees are
likely to be more comfortable using those institutions to protect their inter-
ests. The familiarity is even stronger between unions and the NLRA and
Board, despite the axiom that familiarity breeds contempt.
3. Predictability
Aside from the novel questions that will be specific to labor relations
in Indian country, employees and unions utilizing the NLRA and the Board
will benefit from a large body of precedents. These precedents clarify the
meaning of the law. They also establish commonly recognized standards
for important concepts. For example, precedents reveal what constitutes an
unfair labor practice and which actions a union may or may not take to gain
greater leverage during labor negotiations.
V. CONSIDERING RELIANCE ON APPLICATION OF TRIBAL LABOR LAWS
A. Efficiencies of Reliance on Tribal Labor Laws
1. Fairness to Tribal Employees
Many tribal courts have held that employees of tribal businesses are
entitled to procedural due process when they are terminated from employ-
ment, adopting the federal precedent requiring that government employees
receive due process before they are discharged."
50. See, e.g., Tim Giago, New Gaming Culture Rises in Indian Country, GRAND
FoRKs HERALD, June 30, 2004.
51. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Courts, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and
Customary Law: Preliminary Data 14-16 (Michigan State University College of Law Legal
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2. Better Working Conditions
Tribal councils are more likely to be sympathetic to labor interests.
Whereas the members of the NLRB are typically lawyers with expertise in
labor law and who have never personally held membership in a union or
worked in the kinds of conditions that casino employees experience, many
members of tribal councils have either been members of unions or have
family members who have been members, and many come from working-
class backgrounds that allow them to sympathize and relate to the concerns
of tribal employees.
This respect often translates to better working conditions and better
fringe benefits for tribal employees, as evidenced by the benefits made
available to employees of the Turtle Creek Casino, owned by the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. 2
3. Cultural Match
Research has also shown that tribal communities are more likely to
experience economic success if the political institutions and legal system
operating with the community form a match with the tribe's culture, includ-
ing its values, belief system, and traditions. 3 This principle supports the
notion that tribal protection of labor interests is more likely to be effective if
the processes, remedies, and legal standards that apply to labor issues pos-
sess a cultural match with the tribe. As a result, tribal labor policies and
laws may be more likely to effectively address labor concerns than the laws
and procedures set forth by the NLRA.
4. More Efficient Adjudication in Tribal Court
In many cases, both native and non-native litigants prefer to resolve
their disputes in tribal court rather than state court. This preference stems
from a growing recognition that tribal courts are fair, efficient forums for
conflict resolution. Greater reliance on tribal court adjudication of labor
disputes would promote faster, less costly resolution of disputes. Further-
more, if parties rely upon the traditional forms of peacemaking that many
tribal courts offer, they may find that the process of dispute resolution actu-
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-05, Mar. 6, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 103474.
52. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Attorney for
the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002) ("The casino also pro-
vides some of the best employment opportunities in the region, and all of its employees are
eligible for health insurance benefits, disability benefits and 401 (k) benefit plans.").
53. Miriam Jorgenson, ed., REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (2008).
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ally improves and strengthens relationships. Such effects would be a sig-
nificant improvement over the adversarial method of dispute resolution,
which often exacerbates the sense of alienation and oppositional entrench-
ment that the parties bring to a dispute.
B. Inefficiencies of Reliance on Tribal Labor Laws
1. Underdeveloped Tribal Law
A substantial cost associated with reliance on tribal legal remedies for
the resolution of employment concerns is the fact that many tribes do not
have a large body of positive labor and employment law. Although the re-
cent San Manuel decision has certainly triggered a rise in the number of
tribal labor law enactments, 4 many tribes still have no labor law enact-
ments, little labor-related case law, and few fully implemented administra-
tive bodies with the power to deal with employment issues. For example,
both the Mashantucket Pequot Nation and the Saginaw Chippewa Indian
Tribe attempted to enact tribal labor laws either immediately following or in
tandem with attempts by unions to organize their casino employees." Tri-
bal labor law is therefore an emerging body of law, rather than a well-
established comprehensive legal regime. With any emerging body of law,
there is a degree of uncertainty associated with how the law will be inter-
preted, applied, and enforced. Also, as with any new legal regime, the per-
sons affected by the law must invest in gaining the skills and knowledge
necessary to effectively understand and apply the law.
2. Perceived Unfairness
Another cost associated with reliance on tribal labor laws is the fact
that many tribal employees are non-Indian. Non-Indians lack the right to
vote in tribal elections, and they lack the right to hold office in tribal law-
making bodies. Deprived of the right to vote, these non-Indian employees
are deprived of a fundamental mechanism for influencing tribal policy-
making.
On the other hand, non-Indians are not completely excluded from the
opportunity to participate in tribal politics. Non-Indians can influence tribal
policies that affect the rights and working conditions of employees by lob-
54. See, e.g., 5 GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CODE § 801 (2004), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/gtcode/5.pdf.
55. See MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBA LAWS tit. XXXI (Supp. 2007), available at
http://www.mptnlaw.comlaws/2007%20Supplement.pdf; Gail Courey Toensing, Saginaw
Chippewa Fights Federal Unions with Ban, Education, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 7,
2008, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfin?id=1096416768.
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bying tribal leaders, providing information to tribal leaders in the form of
testimony during legislative hearings, and even serving on tribal commit-
tees, boards, and other public entities that allow for non-Indian participa-
tion. Throughout Indian country, there are a large number of tribes that
allow non-Indians to hold public office. For example, it is very common for
non-Indians to serve as judges on tribal courts.5 6 Many non-Indians also are
permitted to serve on tribal commissions, boards, and committees, including
tribal gaming commissions and tribal economic development committees. 7
Membership on these boards and committees allows non-Indian members of
Indian communities to have an influence on tribal policy-making. For non-
Indian employees of tribal enterprises, such membership can serve as a
means of influencing tribal employment policies and practices.
VI. TRIBAL STRATEGIES TO ENCOURAGE THE USE AND APPLICATION OF
TRIBAL LABOR LAWS
To encourage employees to use tribal labor law remedies, tribes can
adopt a variety of strategies. One of the most important strategies should be
the completion of steps designed to counteract the path dependent pattern of
reflexive resort to federal labor law remedies over alternatives provided by
tribal law. The prescriptions offered by Douglass North for defeating path
dependent patterns in institutional development can be adapted for tribal
use.
For example, North recommends the creation and support of organiza-
tions that have an interest in succeeding under a new legal system or institu-
tional regime. 8 A tribe hoping to encourage reliance on tribal labor law
remedies could support the formation of employee organizations that have
legally recognized rights under tribal law. To the extent that tribal law for-
mally recognizes the status and rights of such labor organizations, these
groups will have an interest in resorting to tribal remedies to vindicate their
rights.
North also recommends the education of individuals to promote their
ability to adapt to the knowledge, skills, and belief systems of the new insti-
tutional regime. Tribes can adapt this strategy to the labor law context by
offering employees training sessions on tribal legal systems that allow em-
56. E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
28, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., _ U.S. _ (2008) (No. 07-
411), available at http://www.narf.org/sct/plainsvlong/merits/amicus of us for respondents
.pdf (noting that three of the four tribal court judges for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that
heard the tribal court case at the trial and appellate court level were non-Indians).
57. See, e.g., ST. REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, GAMING ORDINANCE art. XII, T C (1992).
58. Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Development 7 (Econ.
Dep't of Wash. Univ., Working Paper No. 9309002, 1993), available at
http://129.3.20.4I/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf.
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ployees to learn about the tribe's political history, its form of government,
its principal governing documents, and the labor and employment laws of
the tribe. Such training would extend beyond the cultural training work-
shops that many tribes already offer.59
In addition, employees will be more invested in a tribe's labor law re-
gime if they can gain familiarity with the underlying values that inform tri-
bal law and policy. The adaptation of individuals to new belief systems and
values is a tremendously difficult and slow process, however. Although
there is no silver bullet that can alter the deeply-held belief systems of tribal
employees, tribal employers can at least take steps to actively teach em-
ployees about tribal culture and values and attempt, wherever appropriate,
to include employees in the cultural life of the tribe.
North's third recommendation for promoting institutional change in
the face of path dependent resistance is the encouragement of norms of be-
havior and codes of conduct that support the new institutional regime.6'
One way that tribes could encourage such norms of behavior is to adopt
methods of formally honoring and respecting tribal employees whose ac-
tions exemplify the norms of behavior that support tribal labor and em-
ployment institutions. For example, tribal employees who are actively in-
volved in tribal civic life and tribal labor organizations recognized under
tribal law could be publicly honored and rewarded.6
Finally, tribes can also encourage employees' greater adaptation to tri-
bal legal institutions by emphasizing the ways in which tribal labor laws are
similar to their federal and state counterparts. To the extent that tribes enact
labor protections and remedies that align with the NLRA, for example, tri-
bes can reduce the amount of learning and skill building that employees will
need to develop to be able to take advantage of the Act's protections. The
deeply-rooted beliefs and norms that are integral to the effective use of in-
stitutions will also require less adaptation if tribal laws offer similarities to
key aspects of the NLRA.
In addition to the suggestions above, some strategies are best avoided.
These include failing to do anything at all and enacting labor laws that pro-
59. E.g., Kristina Hughes, Tribe Works to Ensure Language's Future, PETOSKEY
NEWS-REv., Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.petoskeynews.com/articles/2007/03/24/
news/more local/news02.txt.
60. See North, supra note 58.
61. In general, the civic engagement of tribal employees in tribal political and social
life may be the most important tool to encourage greater adaptation to the forms of knowl-
edge, skills, and belief systems that underlie tribal legal institutions. Even without enroll-
ment in a tribe, nonmember and even non-Indian tribal employees often have a variety of
opportunities to engage in tribal civic life. As tribes consider strategies for encouraging
employee use of tribal labor remedies, they might also consider providing more opportunities
for such civic involvement.
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hibit the election of a union.62 Failing to act can lead employees and outside
labor interests to conclude that the only available remedies for the protec-
tion of labor are those derived from the NLRA. If tribes fail to adopt their
own policies, they lose the opportunity to proactively exercise tribal sover-
eignty over promoting tribal welfare. Silence, therefore, can lead to greater
dependence on federal policies and a weakened assertion of self-
determination. Similarly, the enactment of a labor law regime that is more
restrictive than the NLRA or other labor laws that apply to the public sector
can be seriously damaging. Not only are such laws likely to lead to greater
dissatisfaction and unrest among employees, but they could also potentially
serve as national symbols of injustice in the news media and within the legal
system.
CONCLUSION
There are a number of proposals that stem from this consideration of
an economic analysis of labor relations in Indian country. If tribes want to
encourage employee reliance on tribal law remedies for employment con-
cerns, they will need to invest in steps that will break down some of the
barriers to institutional reform that path dependence theory identifies. This
can include the promotion and support of new, alternative organizations of
employees that will allow for collective representation and that will allow
for their existence within the rubric of tribal law. These organizations must
have a stake in looking to tribal law to address labor concerns. It can also
include investment in developing the skills and knowledge of employees to
ensure that they learn about tribal law remedies for employee concerns and
learn how to go about obtaining these remedies. It could even include ac-
tively working to shape the informal norms and belief systems of individu-
als who work in Indian country to encourage the development of employee
mindsets that value tribal legal remedies and that adopt a code of conduct
that presumes working directly with the tribe to address labor issues.
In addition, tribes can also work to decrease the costs and increase the
benefits of resorting to tribal legal remedies for the resolution of employee
concerns. Creating opportunities for direct communication between em-
ployers and employees; simplifying procedural requirements for resolution
of disputes; encouraging speedy resolution of disputes; protecting employ-
ees who raise concerns about employment issues; and providing for pay-
ment of penalties and attorneys' fees for employers found to have violated
tribal law are several possible strategies.
62. Toensing, supra note 55. On September 17, 2008, shortly before this article
went to press, the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe repealed its Tribal Ordinance prohibiting
union organizing.
HeinOnline -- 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 503 2008
504 Michigan State Law Review [Vol. 2008:487
I contend that attention to economic analysis of the law is a useful
analytical tool for developing strategies that will promote the successful
enactment and enforcement of tribal laws and policies that will encourage
tribal economic development and the exercise and strengthening of tribal
sovereignty. This is particularly true given the fact that judges often appear
to use inductive rather than deductive forms of reasoning. In other words,
judges often reach their desired legal outcome first, and then work back-
wards to find a rationale that supports that outcome, rather than using a
more formalist approach that applies fundamental principles and upholds
the outcome favored by those principles. In many contexts, the outcomes
that appear to be favored include those that promote economic efficiency.
Given this trend, the use of lessons imparted by the economic analysis of
the law and institutional economics will assist tribal efforts to protect and
strengthen tribal sovereignty.
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